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Diffusing Environmental Regulation through the Financial
Services Sector: Reforms in the EU and other Jurisdictions
Summary
The financial services sector has the potential to be an important facet of future
systems of environmental governance. But, so far, only ad hoc policy initiatives
have arisen in the EU and other countries addressing the environmental roles of
banks or insurers. Because the financial services sector is where wholesale
decisions regarding future development, and thus pressures on the environment,
arise, reform of investment, banking and insurance services to promote long
term investment and better consideration of environmental impacts may be an
effective way to promote sustainable development. Reforms such as corporate
environmental reporting requirements, mandatory environmental liability
insurance, and lender liability for borrowers' environmental harms, are some of
the ways in which an institutional framework for mobilizing financial
organizations as instruments of environmental regulation could be constructed.
§ 1. Environmental Governance through Financial Institutions
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
Preoccupied by problems of cost efficiency and policy instrument effectiveness,
scholars and policy-makers worldwide have been exploring alternative regulatory
techniques to traditional command-style regulations.' One approach to reinvigorate
+ Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto
1. K. Bosselmann and B.J. Richardson, 'Introduction: New Challenges for Environmental Law and
Policy', in K. Bosselmann and B.J. Richardson (eds.), Environmental Justice and Market Mechanisms,
(Kluwer, 1998), 1-4; N. Gunningham and P. Grabosky, Smart Regulation. Designing Environmental
Policy, (Clarendon Press, 1998).
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environmental governance resides in the financial services sector.2 Behind the activities
of ordinary corporations are financial institutions such as banks, insurers and investors,
which supply the capital and other resources necessary for much economic activity.
Financial organizations are special types of companies or other institutions that are in
the business of providing loans, financial advice, insurance services and management of
investments to other firms and individuals. As the financial services sector is where
wholesale decisions arise regarding future development, and thus environmental
pressures, reform of investment, banking and insurance services to promote better
consideration of environmental impacts may be a highly effective means for deterring
unsustainable development. Whilst there already exist some reasons why financial
service providers wish to avoid supporting environmentally harmful activities (e.g.,
where such activities reduce the profitability of an investment or pose an insurance
risk), more often than not, barriers exist which cause environmental considerations to be
ignored or trivialized in financial decision-making.
This article considers how an approach to environmental regulation diffused through the
financial services sector could be institutionally constructed, and reflects on existing
reforms in the European Union (EU) and other Western economies. Institutional
investment, banking and insurance are each considered in turn. The approach is to
examine the environmental policy relevance of each sector, and how government
regulation could be adjusted to facilitate financial organizations' stronger engagement
with environmental issues. The broad argument is that environmental regulation can be
advanced when governments complement regulation of ordinary companies with
regulation of their financial sponsors, and by harnessing the financial services sector as
a mechanism for environmental governance. Because the financial services sector
sponsors and profits from economic development, it arguably should share
responsibility for ensuring such development accords with environmental standards.
There are various factors, however, which can inhibit financial institutions' focus on the
environment, principally where there are insufficient monetary incentives or inadequate
information. The aim of government regulation promoting shared environmental
governance with this sector must be to ensure that the right directions, incentives and
information are available. If this is achieved, then financial institutions should provide a
means of transmitting and amplifying primary environmental regulatory standards
throughout the economy.
In the EU, there is formal acknowledgement of the potential for 'shared responsibility'
for environmental regulation with financial markets, as briefly referred to first in the
2. See M. Jeucken, Sustainable Finance and Banking: The Financial Sector and the Future of the Planet,
(Earthscan, 2001).
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European Commission's (EC) Fifth Environment Action Programme (1992-2000).
There are several ways in which financial institutions appear generically relevant to
environmental management: as investors, they supply the resources for environmental
initiatives; as stakeholders, such as shareholders and lenders, they exercise influence
over corporate management; and as valuers, they price risks and predict the income of
companies. Despite this potential, little work has been carried out by the EC or others
on the possible environmental roles of financial institutions.4 Nevertheless, the idea of
harnessing market organizations to facilitate policy goals is not unprecedented in public
policy design; the contractual relationship between financial institutions and their
customers has long been regulated to ensure public policy objectives and standards are
met in relation to consumer protection.
B. NOTIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
Mobilizing financial service providers in the quest to create an environmental law
diaspora, whereby regulatory controls are diffused throughout the economy and society,
may be congruent with broader shifts in patterns of governance oriented towards
delegating and sharing responsibilities with the private sector. Because of the perceived
advantages of the private sector in terms of management skills, efficiency and client
knowledge, in various Western countries private organizations have been enlisted to
furnish social services such as health care and undertake local government services, to
name just a few examples.6 Such shifts can also be understood in terms of the desire of
policy-congested states, unable to satisfy competing demands, to find ways to off-load
responsibilities to civil society and the market.7 Various regulatory theorists emphasize
that regulators operate increasingly in a pluralistic setting in which effective governance
resides in flexible, collaborative mechanisms in which state functions are shared with or
devolved to private interests. 8 Unlike 'government', which denotes organizations and
rules and implies a demarcation between public and private sectors, governance is
viewed as centering on the complex interdependencies among actors, the inter-
organizational linkages involving an array of market and non-governmental bodies. So,
3. EC, Fifth Environment Action Programme, Towards Sustainability: A European Community
Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development, (EC,
1992), 25.
4. See, e.g., Delphi International and Ecological GMBH, The Role of Financial Institutions in Achieving
Sustainable Development, (Delphi International, 1997); B.J. Richardson, Environmental Regulation
through Financial Organisations, (Kluwer, 2002); S. Labatt and R.R. White, Environmental Finance:
A Guide to Environmental Risk Assessment and Financial Products, (John Wilely & Sons, 2002).
5. R. Cranston, Principles ofBanking Law, (Clarendon Press, 1997), 153.
6. J.D. Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means, (Basic Books, 1989).
7. See J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, (Beacon Press, 1973); C. Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare
State, (Massachussetts Institute of Technology Press, 1987).
8. See Rein, 'The Social Structure of Institutions: Neither Public nor Private', in S.B. Kamerman and A.J.
Kahn (eds.), Privatization and the Welfare State, (Princeton University Press, 1989); J.Q. Wilson, The
Politics ofRegulation, (Basic Books, 1980).
10 MJ 3 (2003) 235
Diffusing Environmental Regulation through the Financial Services Sector
instead of a government monopoly on regulation, governance suggests a combination of
rules, incentives and informational mechanisms by which the state seeks to steer and co-
ordinate the non-government sector, and processes by which the private sector exerts its
own influence.' Thus, Freeman sees governance as a process of 'negotiated
relationships' between public and private actors,' 0 whilst Hancher and Moran
emphasize shared 'regulatory spaces' inhabited by strategic government and private
sector organizations." Financial organizations such as banks and pension funds are
highly relevant to such debates, as they are in effect 'gate-keepers' to the economy,
supplying development loans for small businesses, equity capital for large public
companies, or insurance coverage for companies engaged in environmentally risky
activities. Schemes to diffuse environmental policy through the market more effectively
must work with those strategically placed financial institutions that have the capacity to
communicate and enforce policy goals and standards.
But the scope for sharing environmental governance with financial organizations must
be influenced by the tools chosen for articulating environmental policy through this
sector. Sometimes 'governance' may involve government delegating certain
environmental supervisory tasks to financial institutions, but at other times governance
will need to rely on more direct government supervision, depending on the nature of the
issue, and the resources and expertise available to parties. Where quite entrenched
features of the financial services sector impede sustainable development, somewhat
greater reliance may need to be placed on direct command style controls and
environmental liability rules. In other contexts, where financial institutional responses
owe more to information and incentive deficits, use of economic incentives and
informational mechanisms to promote collaborative governance would seem
appropriate.
Governance is influenced by the fact that banks and other financial service providers are
commercial entities interested in profitability, rather than pursuing ethically laudable
objectives per se. They are not in the business of subsidizing good environmental
practices. Another consideration is that direct regulatory commands are likely to be
politically controversial, and thus vulnerable to implementation failure. There are
several reasons why informational, incentive and liability tools should be emphasized.
Reflexive law theorists such as Teubner argue that because of the disaggregation of
modem societies into relatively discrete subsystems, such as the market, with their own
codes and norms, regulation is more likely to succeed when it deploys less invasive
mechanisms that serve to stimulate desired behaviour within market actors, producing
an enhanced sensitivity to public policy objectives and a readiness to reflect on and
9. Stoker, 'Governance as Theory', 50 International Social Sciences Journal 155 (1998), 17.
10. Freeman, 'The Private Role in Public Governance', 75 New York University Law Review (2000), 543.
I1. L. Hancher and M. Moran, 'Organizing Regulatory Space', in L. Hancher and M. Moran (eds.),
Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation, (Clarendon Press, 1989).
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adjust organizational policies and procedures accordingly.12 Corporate environmental
reporting is an example of this approach. Economic instruments such as pollution taxes
and tradeable emission permits are also considered to have reflexive properties, in that
they can explicitly convey in the language of market systems the price of engaging in
environmentally exploitative activities.1 3 Sometimes, government conscription of
financial organizations in the name of environmental policy will be welcomed as
creating new market opportunities, such as requirements for firms to have their
environmental performance assessed and certified by private auditors, or obligations to
carry environmental liability insurance.14 The delegation and assignment of regulatory
roles to auditors, accountants and other professions can be useful where they can
competently develop appropriate regulatory standards and undertake effective
supervision on behalf of the state. Overall, government regulation should aim primarily
to make corporate environmental performance relevant to financial institutions'
evaluation of corporate economic performance. Without this synergy, shared
environmental governance will likely be resisted by financial organizations as a set of
extraneous, imposed requirements, and there will concomitantly be a need for greater
reliance on government rather than collaboration with the private sector.
Beyond questions of institutional design for promoting financial organizations'
involvement, there are differences across countries and business sectors that will foster
or inhibit governments from bringing financial entities into the environmental policy
framework. For example, mobilizing institutional investors as a vehicle for corporate
environmental responsibility arguably depends on the existence of extensive equity
markets dominated by pension funds and other large investors. In the EU, only the
United Kingdom (UK), Switzerland and the Netherlands strongly feature such
conditions.' 5 Elsewhere, the United States (US) and Australia also have a well-
developed institutional investor sector. One reason why Australia and the UK were
among the first nations to introduce ethical investment reforms (as discussed below)
appears to be because of the presence in each country of well-developed lobby groups
for ethical investment reforms, namely Australia's Ethical Investment Association and
the UK Social Investment Forum (UKSIF). In some jurisdictions, notably Germany and
Japan, banks play a relatively larger role in corporate financing and so environmental
regulation strategies that seek to mobilize the financial services providers would need to
focus on the banking sector. National traditions and styles of environmental regulation
is also an important variable. Countries with a tradition of economic deregulation and
12. Teubner, 'Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modem Law', 17 Law and Society Review (1983),
239.
13. Orts, 'Reflexive Environmental Law', 89 Northwestern University Law Review 4 (1995), 1227.
14. Grabosky, 'Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance', 8 Governance 4
(1995), 527 at 530-36.
15. Blommestein, 'Impact of Institutional Investors on Financial Markets', in Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (ed.), Institutional Investors in the New Financial Landscape, (OECD,
1998).
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use of economic policy instruments may be more receptive to addressing the role of
financial organizations. Another important driver towards reform is the existence of
supranational institutions and policies with an interest in this subject. Some European
developments have occurred against the backdrop of EU policy in the Fifth
Environment Action Programme. Globally, an emerging catalyst to boost the profile of
environmental issues in global financial markets is the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), which has launched a Financial Institutions Initiative wherein
banks and other financial entities pledge themselves to specified sustainable
development practices. 16
The prospects for reform of financial institutions are also likely to be shaped by the
increasing transnational character of financial markets. Technological advances and the
deregulation of capital markets in Western economies have greatly accelerated the
geographical mobility of capital in its search for the most lucrative investments.17 The
globalization of banking, insurance and investment services reduces the power of states
individually to regulate financial institutions.'1 Domestic regulatory moves that threaten
economic interests can prompt the migration of financial resources to jurisdictions
perceived as offering a more benign regulatory milieu. National regulators may also
face capacity and information deficits when attempting to supervise enterprises engaged
in complex trans-border commerce. International agreements and institutions are thus
necessary to prevent environmentally enlightened financial service providers from
suffering competitive disadvantages in their transnational business. Whilst this article
does not explore the global regulation of financial bodies, it can be noted that apart from
in the EU, the existing international regulatory apparatus in this sector is in an
embryonic state.19 Clearly, a shift to shared environmental governance will unavoidably
become more intertwined with internationalized patterns of policy-making involving
international organizations and other transnational actors.
The shift towards shared governance is not without challenges and potential problems
for the state. Dangers range from policy incoherence, if the state is unable to
strategically direct decision-making, to complete policy failures if private institutions
capture and distort regulatory programmes. More ambiguously, there is the risk of a
weakening of public culture as administrative functions are displaced through
devolution to the private sector where different economic values prevail.20 Rhodes
warns that without effective systems of democratic supervision, governance networks
may be less accountable than the state if decisions are largely removed from the
16. UNEP, Statement by Banks on Environment and Sustainable Development, (Advisory Committee on
Banking and the Environment, 1992).
17. A. Walter, World Power and World Money, (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 202-04.
18. J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation, (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7-8.
19. See EC, Institutional Arrangements for the Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Sector, (EC
Internal Market Directorate General, 2000).
20. P. Self, Government by the Market? The Politics ofPublic Choice, (Macmillan Press, 1993).
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traditional governmental apparatus. 2' Because of the risk that shared governance may
generate confusion among regulatees and the broader community regarding where final
authority and policy responsibility lies, it is essential that chains of regulatory control
are readily traceable back to the primary government authorities. Careful design of
monitoring and oversight mechanisms is needed to ensure the state is able to track and
verify implementation of policy goals and ensure governance systems are
democratically nourished. Grabosky sees the challenge as one of 'meta-monitoring', by
which government agencies focus on 'strategic surveillance' and 'monitoring the
overall regulatory system' but engage in 'authoritative intervention' where third party
22resources are lacking.
In addition to appropriate definition of the institutional relationships between the state
and market, collaborative environmental governance raises the question of what
environmental policy functions are to be actually shared. There is an extensive literature
which highlights problems markets face in addressing environmental concerns,
including undervaluation of ecological properties, discounting of future environmental
costs and benefits, 23 and an inability to address the problem of scale, or aggregate
resource use within biosphere limits. 24 Decentralized financial markets cannot guide
society towards specific environmental goals without government direction.
Environmental policy goals must derive from an interdisciplinary analysis of ecological,
social and economic considerations, undertaken within participatory policy systems.
Also, financial institutions are unable to offer the same public participation and
information rights and procedures that are an integral part of current environmental
regulation in many countries. Economic analysis can help determine the cost of
achieving such ecological standards, but not the substantive merits of environmental
objectives, which arises from participatory policy-making. In terms of expertise and
management systems, financial service providers also cannot undertake many of the
specialist functions of modern environmental agencies in government. Thus, whilst
there should be room for sharing environmental responsibilities with financial
organizations regarding the financing of green developments and management of
pollution risks, it is inconceivable that banks or insurers could operate national parks or
be urban planners. The value of the financial services sector lies in its strategic market
position that can be manipulated by government rules, information and monetary
incentives to enable environmentally sound companies to flourish at the expense of
polluters and resource degraders. The following sections canvass this theme and current
reforms in the three main financial sectors.
21. R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and
Accountability, (Open University Press, 1997), 54.
22. Grabosky, 8 Governance 4 (1995), 527 at 544.
23. See R. Costanza et al., An Introduction to Ecological Economics, (St. Lucie Press, 1997).
24. Daly, 'Allocation, Distribution and Scale: Towards an Economics that is Efficient, Just and
Sustainable', 6 Ecological Economics 3 (1992), 185.
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§ 2. Institutional Investors
A. OPPORTUNITIES FOR AND CONSTRAINTS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENT
Environmental issues can alter the economic assumptions that underlie an investor's
decision to commit capital to an enterprise. Systems of capital investment are where
primary decisions regarding future development, and thus pressures on the environment,
begin.25 Given that sustainable development stresses maintenance of natural and human
capital for posterity, the role of capital markets must be recognized as pivotal to
sustainability strategies.26 Financial markets generally provide capital to businesses with
the objective that it should ideally grow and generate profits. Whilst there is a difference
between financial capital (i.e., economic assets and income) and the broader concept of
capital in sustainable development (i.e., natural resources and ecosystem integrity),
financial capital is relevant to the environment as it enables major investments to be
undertaken, such as technological innovations, which invariably have environmental
effects of some form. Sharing environmental governance with this sector of the
financial markets can be achieved by encouraging investors to favour environmentally
sound companies and to use their financial leverage to make corporate management and
policy more mindful of natural resource use and pollution concerns.
Today, capital markets are overwhelmingly dominated by large institutional investors,
rather than by individual 'amateur' shareholders.27 In recent decades, institutional
savings have mushroomed as societies make greater private provision for old age in the
face of shrinking welfare entitlements. As financial intermediaries, investors assist with
risk reduction by pooling and diversifying assets and lowering the transaction costs of
contracting and information processing.28 The institutional investment community has a
diverse membership, including public and private pension funds, mutual funds, life
insurance companies, university foundations and funds managed by banks. A technical
distinction can be made between institutional investors per se, involving, for example,
the investment actions of pension funds using their beneficiaries' monies, and retail
investments, where individuals directly contribute to a mutual fund that specializes in
investing in certain market segments. In both cases, however, a specific investment
institution is managing investments. Within the OECD area, insurance companies are
25. S. Schmideiny and F. Zorraquin, Financing Change: The Financial Community, Eco-Efficiency and
Sustainable Development, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1996).
26. England, 'Natural Capital and the Theory of Economic Growth', 34 Ecological Economics 3 (2000),
425.
27. Rada and Trisoglio, 'Capital Markets and Sustainable Development', 27 Columbia Journal of World
Business 3/4 (1992), 42.
28. Black, 'Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice', 39 U.C.L.A. Law
Review (1992), 813.
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the largest investors, followed by pension funds.2 9 Apart from commercial investors,
there is also an assortment of communal financial entities, such credit unions, building
societies, industrial and provident associations and public charities, which can make a
worthwhile contribution to social investment and community regeneration.30
The relationship between financial markets, investors and sustainable development is
problematic. There is evidence that financial markets do not efficiently allocate capital,
and that unsustainable, speculative bubbles suck in financial resources whilst inefficient
under-investment arises at other times or in other sectors.3 Such capital flows may be
associated with adverse social and environmental effects arising from company and
project investment choices. These problems have been framed by some commentators
as arising from a distinction between the 'paper' investments of the myopic financial
markets against 'real' investments in socially useful goods and services. Yet, a number
of commentators stress the growing benign influence of institutional investors in
promoting sustainable development. In their book The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism,
Hawley and Williams identify the institutional investor as a new voice for promoting
corporate social and environmental responsibility. 3  This is because institutional
investors are 'universal owners' holding a broad portfolio of stocks, and possessing an
interest in the health and long-term sustainability of the entire economy rather than the
profitability of individual businesses. As fiduciaries, long-term investors and majority
owners, Hawley and Williams assert that institutional investors are not concerned with
short-term returns on investment, but rather long-term performance to meet the needs of
their present and future beneficiaries. Similarly, Monks, in The New Global Investor,
argues that the universal or 'global investor', 'is likely to make good decisions for the
long-term of society, because it can afford in most cases to take a long-term view, and a
diversified view. An ordinary domestic investor may need to reap profits in the short
term' . Hawley and Williams believe that universal owner status gives institutional
investors an interest in public policy governance issues in areas outside the traditional
macroeconomic agenda. They state: 'a universal owner that really wants to maximize
the shareholder value of its portfolio would need to develop public policy-like positions
and monitor regulatory developments and legislation on a number of key issues for the
economy as a whole'.35 Accordingly, businesses in which they invest should be
29. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Institutional Investors: Statistical
Yearbook 1998, (OECD, 1999).
30. See A. Hudson, The Law on Investment Entities, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 259-94.
31. Baker and Fung, 'Collateral Damage: Do Pension Fund Investments Hurt Workers?' in A. Fung, T.
Hebb and J. Rogers (eds.), Working Capital: The Power of Labor's Pensions, (Cornell University
Press, 2001), 13.
32. J. Stanford, Paper Boom: Why Real Prosperity Requires a New Approach to Canada 's Economy,
(Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1999), 65.
33. J.P. Hawley and A.T. Williams, The Rise ofFiduciary Capitalism, (University of Pennsylvania Press,
2000).
34. R.A.G. Monks, The New Global Investors, (Capstone Publishing Limited, 2001), 105.
35. Hawley and Williams, The Rise ofFiduciary Capitalism, 170.
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conducted in a financially, socially and environmentally responsible manner that
supports a healthy and sustainable economy.
Certainly, the growth of institutional investment funds has pooled mammoth resources
capable of exerting significant leverage over corporate environmental activities. And
there are many reasons why the environment might be of interest to institutional
investors. Pension funds and life insurance companies in particular have long-term
financial liabilities, providing a structural incentive to favour lasting, sustainable
investment. Further, fund managers have fiduciary responsibilities in trust law and
statute to take an active interest in corporate governance. Ethical screening can appeal
to investors because it reinforces notions of socially responsible governance. There is
growing evidence of a correlation between corporations that embody socially
responsible governance and sustainable development. Good environmental and social
performance is often seen as a proxy for a financially well-managed company. In North
America, there is growing empirical evidence of a correlation between share price
movements and corporate environmental performance. t Poor environmental
performance that threatens firm profitability is thus a basis for intervention in corporate
management or the switching of investments.
There is evidence in the EU and internationally of a growing niche market for
environmental investment products and funds. Environmentally responsible investment
is being effected in several ways, most commonly through 'ethical screening' involving
the inclusion or exclusion of shares in investment portfolios on environmental grounds,
'cause' based project investments, and shareholder activism to change corporate policy
and practice.3 9 In the EU, there were estimated to be some 250 specialist ethical
investment funds taking account of environmental and other concerns operating in
2001, up from a mere 50 such funds a decade earlier.40 The founding of several indices
to track ethical investments points to the growing legitimacy of this sector. Leading
ethical investment indices include the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index and the
UK's Financial Times Stock Exchange's 'ethical index'. Yet the total size of ethical
investment funds is still small compared to the market capitalization of companies in
which they invest; in the UK, ethical investment in September 2001 comprised a mere
36. Tasch and Viederman, 'New Concepts of Fiduciary Responsibility', in F. Capra and G. Pauli (eds.),
Steering Business Toward Sustainability, (United Nations University Press, 1995), 125.
37. See generally R. Sparkes, Socially Responsible Investment: A Global Revolution, (John Wiley & Sons,
2002).
38. E.g., Lanoie, Laplante and Roy, 'Can Capital Markets Create Incentives for Pollution Control?', 26
Ecological Economics 1 (1998), 31; Blacconiere and Northcut, 'Environmental Information and
Market Reactions to Environmental Information', 12 Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 2
(1997), 149
39. R. Sparkes, The Ethical Investor, (Harper Collins, 1995), 1-18.
40. Sustainable Development Research International Group, Green, Social and Ethical Funds in Europe in
2001, (SDRIG, 2002), 7.
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3.5 per cent share of the investment market, compared to 13 per cent in the US. 4' But,
encouragingly, the growth of ethical investments in recent years has tended to exceed
other investments. However, whether it will grow out of its 'niche' position to a more
pervasive feature of financial markets is currently unclear.
There are countervailing barriers to more environmentally sensitive investment
practices, including inadequate information about corporate environmental
performance, the absence of appropriate taxes on environmental resource use and
pollution, which can thereby make it difficult to measure environmental performance in
financially relevant terms, and structural barriers in corporate governance systems that
can impede investor shareholder activism. Investor uncertainty concerning the
environmental integrity of a product or company performance is a major barrier.
Surveys of the financial services sector have revealed a patchy understanding of the
relevance of corporate environmental performance.42 The lack of corporate reporting on
environmental activities and costs is a factor that undoubtedly has contributed to this
poor understanding. As discussed later in this article, mandating some level of
environmental reporting by businesses is a necessary reform if investors are to be
mobilized as instruments of environmental governance.
In common law jurisdictions such as the US and UK, institutional investor passivity or
ignorance may also be explained in terms of the effect of trust law precedents. Trustee
investors who are required to invest prudentially on behalf of others (e.g., pension
funds) may find the safest course is to adopt investment strategies similar to their peers.
Notions of fiduciary responsibility have been interpreted in the seminal British cases of
Cowan v Scargille3 and Martin v City of Edinburgh District Councip4 as constraining
pension fund managers from taking into account ethical factors that may detract from
securing the optimal financial return for beneficiaries when choosing investments.
However, where an investment fund is established explicitly as an ethical investment
vehicle, then the trust law constraints against green investment are largely removed so
long as the optimal financial returns within the agreed governing framework of
environmental or other investment principles are pursued. In continental Europe,
quantitative regulation of investment portfolios is typically applied, such as restrictions
on particular classes of investment including foreign securities, real estate and loans.
41. Cerulli Associates, The Cerulli Edge - Global Edition, (Sept. 2001), at <www.cerulli.com>.
42. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Report on Financial Institutions Initiative - Australia,
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000).
43. (1984) 2 All ER 750.
44. (1988) SLT 329.
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Asset type restrictions on where EU-based funds can invest appear to be diminishing,
partly due to the recent UCITS amendment Directive of 2001.45
In many countries, company law rules can be the source of constraints to ethically-
minded investor activism. Because of legal constraints on concentrated ownership,
fiduciary obligations that require extensive diversification to minimize risk and a strong
preference for liquidity, institutional investment agents have tended to seek portfolios
comprising fragmented holdings across a plethora of companies.46 This can reduce the
influence of an investor or discourage activism because the stakes may be considered
too small given the size of the institution's equity holdings. However, the regulatory
trend in Western states has been for securities watchdogs to liberalize rules restricting
shareholder proposals from management's proxy statement and other company law
obstacles to shareholder activism. 47 Although EU institutions are increasingly setting
standards for corporate governance, innovative reforms are still occurring in a number
of EU Member States, such as Britain.48
B. PROMOTING ETHICAL FINANCE
Among the other reforms that can stimulate shared environmental governance with
investors are requirements that investment institutions consider the environmental
effects of their own activities and publicly report on their policies in this respect. In the
UK, for instance, in July 1999 the government promulgated a regulation under the
Pensions Act 1995 requiring occupational pension fund trustees to disclose their
policies on socially responsible investment and on the exercise of shareholder rights,
including voting rights.4 9 This UK initiative has inspired similar reforms in the EU and
Australia.5 0 Legislation requiring pension fund managers to disclose or take account of
environmental, social or ethical considerations in their investment policies has arisen in
France, 5' Germany, 52 Sweden 3 and Belgium. 54 The French and Swedish examples
45. Directive 2001/108/EC amending Council Directive 85/611/EEC on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in
transferable securities (UCITS), with regard to investments of UCITS, [2002] O.J. L41/35.
46. Lee, 'Modem Portfolio Theory and the Investment of Pension Funds', in P. Finn (ed.), Equity and
Commercial Relationships, (Law Book Company, 1987), 303.
47. See, e.g., recent changes in Australia to the Company Law Review Act 1998; and Canada's 2001
amendments to the Business Corporations Act 1985.
48. UK, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Final Report. Annex C, Statement ofDirector's Duties, (DTI, 2001).
49. Enacted pursuant to s 35(3)(f), Pensions Act 1995: Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment, and
Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy etc), Amendment Regulations 1999, cl. 2(4).
50. See Richardson, 'Pensions Law Reform and Environmental Policy: A New Role for Institutional
Investors?', 3 Journal ofInternational Financial Markets: Law and Regulation 5 (2002), 159.
51. Projet de loi sur 1'dpargne salariale, 7 February 2001. No.2001-152, article 2; Projet de loi portant
diverses dispositions d'ordre social, iducatifet culturel. 28 June 2001, Chapitre Vbis, article L.135-8.
52. Betriebliche Altersvorsorge: article 10, Anderung des Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetzes.
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include obligations to actually take the environment into account, although these
requirements pertain largely to state-based pension schemes. Another ambitious reform
was undertaken in Australia, whereby the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 applied
an ethical disclosure obligation on a wider range of investment products including:
pensions, managed investment products and investment life insurance products.5 5 But,
like the UK initiative, none of the more recent examples attempts to statutorily define
criteria of ethical investment, and all only weakly address the challenge of monitoring
compliance. Recent empirical evidence of the effect of the UK reforms suggests that
whilst there has been a significant increase in adoption of ethical investment policies by
pension funds, the quality and implementation of such policies has been weak.
Beyond environmental disclosure requirements for investors, governments could
consider mandating consideration of environmental issues in the regulatory envelope
governing financial regulators. During the preparation of the UK's Financial Services
and Market Act 2000, which created a single regulator for the financial services
industry, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the UKSIF argued before the House
of Commons Environmental Audit Committee that there had been no environmental
appraisal of the statute's potential consequences. The UKSIF unsuccessfully requested
inclusion of a reference to sustainable development in the Authority's mandate; for
example, to require best practice in environmental risk management and to encourage
the provision of environmental investment and environmental lending products.57 In the
absence of an explicit political mandate, at best financial regulators could be expected
to issue guidance notes on environmentally prudent investment practices. Already, the
Environment Department and the Corporation of London issued in August 2002 their
so-called London Principles of Sustainable Finance, which advocate a limited range of
measures to improve acknowledgement of the environmental dimensions of financial
market activities.
Apart from domestic-sourced rules, the EU Member States are subject increasingly to
EU financial law, and, less intrusively, emerging international standards. The EU has
issued a plethora of directives and policies to ensure competition in financial services
53. Cited in Fjarde AP-fonden (Fourth Swedish National Pension Fund), A Presentation ofSweden's New
National Pension Funds, (Fjirde AP-fonden: 2001).
54. Projet de loi relative aur pensions compldmentaires, article 42.
55. See Richardson, 'Ethical Investment and the Commonwealth's Financial Services Reform Act 2001', 2
National Environmental Law Review (2002), 47.
56. D. Coles and D. Green, Do UK Pension Funds Invest Responsibly?, (JustPensions, 2002), 1.
57. UKSIF, 'UK Social Investment Forum tells MPs of Need to Include Environment in Framework for
Financial services regulator', Press Release, (19 April 1999).
58. Corporation of London, and Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DERFA), Financing
the Future. The London Principles: The Role of UK Financial Services in Sustainable Development,
(DEFRA, 2002), 7.
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markets.59 But no EU-wide financial services regulator has been established.
Environmental concerns have hardly been a feature of EU services financial regulation
to date. The EC's proposal in 2000 for a directive on the activities of institutions for
occupational retirement provision60 omitted any environmental disclosure provisions,
although an amendment to the EC's proposal was later advanced in the European
Parliament to provide an obligation to refer to 'ethical and socially responsible
investment principles' in the Article 12(1) disclosure of investment policies
requirements.6 Elsewhere, amendments to the EU's Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme 62 and the Eco-Label Regulation63 have allowed for their extension to financial
services, thereby enabling investment and other financial service products to be more
readily assessed and compared in terms of their environmental credentials.64
One possibility for future EU financial services law reform would be to authorize
establishment of a specific ethical investment institution, that would be free to invest in
a range of asset types according to environmental, social and other ethical criteria.
Mayo and Mullineux suggest such an institution could function as a mutual investment
fund that is open-ended and working under contract law, and thus able to give priority
to environmental and social returns over financial returns.65 Whilst there appears to be
some merit in legislating for a specialist ethical financing vehicle, it poses the risk that
mainstream investors (e.g., pension funds) would see the environment as an issue not
directly relevant to their own operations. For ethical finance to be integrated into
financial markets, it must become embedded in the culture of mainstream financiers. At
a minimum, this would seem to require maintenance of obligations on investment
institutions to appraise their environmental activities and impacts, and to disclose their
ethical investment policies.
Besides appropriate financial and information incentives to promote environmental
investment, there is the nagging issue of the internal governance of investment
institutions. In relation to pension funds, for example, there is debate on the merits of
59. By way of introduction, see EC, Institutional Arrangements for the Regulation and Supervision of the
Financial Sector (EC, 2000). See, e.g., Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment
services in the securities field, [1993] O.J. L141/27; Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on
capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, [1993] O.J. L141/1.
60. COM(2000) 507 final.
61. European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Draft Report on the Proposal
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Activities of Institutions for Occupational
Retirement Provision, (8 May 2001). PE 295.986/AM/48-134, at 52.
62. Council Regulation 761/2001 of 19 March 2001 allowing voluntary participation by organisations in a
Community eco-management and audit scheme, [2001] O.J. L114/1.
63. Council Regulation 1980/2000 of 17 July 2000 on a revised Community Eco-label Award Scheme,
[2000] O.J. L237/1.
64. For analysis, see Richardson, 'Implications of Recent Changes to the EMAS and Eco-label Regulations
for the Financial Services Sector', 14 Environmental Law and Management 2 (2002), 131.
65. E. Mayo and A. Mullineux, Regulation ofSocial Investment, (New Economics Foundation, 2000).
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democratizing pension fund governance to ensure that worker beneficiaries have more
say in how their monies are invested. 6 Through worker influence over pension fund
investments, there could be a shift away from short-term profit focus to long-term real
investment. Some labour movement activists are attempting to acquire greater
representation on pension fund boards of trustees either through joint or sole trusteeship,
or to establish advisory boards to these bodies. In Canada, for example, Quebec pension
legislation establishes mechanisms for employee representation on pension management
boards. Other salient models for democratizing pension fund administration exist in
Germany and Switzerland. But contrary to the optimism enunciated by Drucker in his
book Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America,8 the reality
is that pension plan beneficiaries generally do not control where their pension monies
are invested.6 9 The question of how the governance of pension funds and other
investment entities should be democratized, and the connections between democratic
governance and sustainable development, is beyond the scope of this Article. But it is
likely to become an important pathway for promoting social justice in the context of
environmental governance in financial markets.
§3. Banks
A. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN BANKING
Whereas institutional investors are relevant to environmental financing through their
investments in the equity markets, banks are important for their role in providing project
finance for specific developments and in funding small, unlisted businesses. Banks are
financial intermediaries for the receipt of deposits from members and deployment of
such deposits by way of loans and investments for development and consumption
purposes. For banks worldwide, environmental issues are becoming a stronger concern
for several reasons. 70 First, there is the prospect of direct lender liability where a bank
becomes responsible for the environmental liabilities of its clients, such as contaminated
land cleanup liability. Second, environmental problems can generate indirect credit
risks for lenders where a borrower experiences financial hardship. Third, there is
reputational risk for banks when associated with environmentally controversial
66. See F. Kodar, Corporate Law, Pension Law and the Transformative Potential of Pension Fund
Investment Activism, (LLM Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 2002), 57.
67. Supplemental Pension Plans Act, S.Q. 2001, c. R-15.1.
68. P. Drucker, Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America, (Harper & Row,
1976).
69. J. Rifkin and R. Barber, The North Will Rise Again: Pensions, Politics and Power in the 1980s,
(Beacon Press, 1978).
70. Richardson, 'Environmental Liability and Banks: Recent European Developments', 17 Journal of
International Banking Law 10 (2000), 289 at 290.
71. Rose-Ackerman, 'Environmental Liability Law', in T.H. Tietenberg (ed.), Innovation in Environmental
Policy, (Ashgate, 1992), 243; J.J. Norton, R.M. Auerback and J.M. Gaba, Environmental Liability for
Banks, (Lloyd's of London Press, 1995).
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developments. In the EU, a number of banks have gone beyond these features of
'defensive' banking, involving the avoidance of obvious environmental problems, to the
conscious promotion of sustainable development through differential interest rates and
other services and incentives provided to encourage environmentally friendly
development.72 Banks in the latter mould include UmweltBank in Germany, the Triodos
Bank in the Netherlands and the UK's Co-operative Bank.
Interest by private banks in environmental matters is also being shaped by reforms to
the provision of public development finance. Notably, there have been extensive
changes to the operations of the multilateral development banks (MDBs), which have
adopted environmental procedures and standards that clients must satisfy for project
approvals. The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development has gone the
furthest in this respect and is the only MDB to be given a specific environmental
mandate in its charter.74 Multilateral development bank environmental lending standards
can provide benchmarks for private banks interested in environmental issues. 5 Of
course, many private banks have not been inspired by the MDB reforms or other
reasons to consider the environment because of differences in their loan portfolio,
clientele and other aspects of the financial markets they work in, and differences in the
regulatory structures by which they are governed. The challenge for policy reformers is
first to identify areas of banking operations in which environmental policy concerns can
be relevant and can be feasibly embedded into governance regimes.
The relationship between borrowers and lenders is one of the critical points at which the
interests of the environment can be factored into economic decision-making. Lenders
often face a long payback period, and their concern for repayment creates in theory an
interest in the sustainability of the borrower's activities. This interest can be articulated
where institutional processes are available that allow banks to share their expertise with
and give guidance to their borrowers. In the US, threats of contaminated site liabilities
under the so-called Superfund legislation 76 helped catapult environmental concerns to
the forefront of banks' analysis of credit arrangements. Many banks insist on indemnity
agreements in loan contracts or demand that borrowers obtain liability insurance.
Nonetheless, such liabilities may lower the credit worthiness of the debtor (or
72. See J.J. Bouma, M. Jeucken and L. Klinkers (eds.), Sustainable Banking: the Greening of Finance,
(Greenleaf Publishing, 2001).
73. World Bank, Mainstreaming the Environment: The World Bank Group and the Environment, (World
Bank, 1995).
74. Article 21(vii) requires the Bank to 'promote in the full range of its activities environmentally sound
and sustainable development': Agreement establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, [1990] O.J. L372.
75. Bank of America, 1999 Environmental Progress Report, (Bank of America, 2000), 17.
76. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 1980, Pub. L. No.96-510,
94 Stat. 2767 (11 Dec. 1980), codified at 42 USC §§ 9601-9675.
77. See Peck, 'Viable Protection Mechanisms for Lenders Against Hazardous Waste', 18 Hofstra Law
Review (1989), 89 at 109.
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guarantor) or reduce the value of any security. Appraising the environmental sequelae
of loan proposals helps protect a bank financially; projects that incur environmental
liabilities may adversely affect a borrower's cash flows and thereby compromise loan
repayments. A more ambitious role for banks involves going beyond the mere vetoing
of projects posing environmental liabilities, to being a facilitator, whereby companies
and industries are steered towards best environmental practice. The greatest reach of the
banking sector here is in its relationship to smaller, private companies reliant on debt
financing, as they are not listed on the stock market. Banks can be influential here
through lending practices, by providing information, and offering specialist
environmental financial services (e.g., energy efficiency loans). Banks may be in a
position to compel borrowers to conform to new global industry standards with respect
to product quality, production processes and labelling. 8 But without government
intervention to embed environmental standards in banking regulation, this sector may be
disinclined to voluntarily undertake such a role except where it relates to avoidance of
potential environmental liabilities or achievement of more profits.
B. REFORMING THE BANKING SECTOR
Recent EU developments point to some ways in which this problem could be corrected.
The EU's Eco-management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) Regulation and Eco-label
Regulation, both voluntary schemes for businesses, have been amended to encompass
financial institutions and products. The need to open the EMAS Regulation to the
financial sector has been acknowledged for several years, as the site-based focus of the
original 1993 EMAS Regulation made it unsuitable for measuring the indirect
environmental effects of the financial decisions of banks and investors. 79 The EMAS
Regulation was revised in March 2001 to extend the scheme to all sectors of economic
activity with a focus on company operations as a whole rather than on specific industrial
sites.80 There is more emphasis on 'indirect environmental aspects', defined as
including 'capital investments, granting loans and insurance services' . In addition, the
1992 Eco-Label Regulation was amended in 2000 to redefine 'products' to include 'any
goods and services', thus implementing earlier European proposals to expand the Eco-
Label scheme to the financial services sector.82 This reform means that banking and
investment products can be more readily assessed and compared in terms of their
environmental credentials, and this should facilitate marketing and reward innovation.
These EU innovations point to a style of shared environmental governance that relies on
78. Rondinelli and Vastag, 'International Environmental Standards and Corporate Policies: An Integrative
Framework', 39 California Management Review I (1996), 106.
79. EC, Workshop on Sustainable Development - Challenge for the Financial Sector, (EC, 1998), 12.
80. Council Regulation No. 761/2001/EC of 19 March 2001 allowing voluntary participation by
organisations in a Community eco-management and audit scheme, [2001] O.J. LI 14/1.
81. Ibid, Annex. cl. 6.3(b).
82. Council Regulation No. 1980/2000 of 17 July 2000 on a revised Community Eco-label Award Scheme,
[2000] O.J. L237/1.
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voluntary approaches and market incentives for corporate participation, such as an
improved environmental profile among environmentally conscious consumers and
productivity gains through reduced waste and resource consumption.
In relation to national banking regulation, no serious consideration has yet been made
by governments as to whether environmental policy concerns should be grafted into
control systems. Banks are incorporated entities and hence subject to company law
controls. Because of their responsibilities as repositories for people's savings, banks are
subject to additional prudential regulation which addresses a range of public policy
concerns, principally investor-protection and consumer service standards, through
capital adequacy and liquidity requirements. Money laundering controls, requiring
financial institutions to report suspicious transactions, illustrates the ability of
government to harness banks as co-regulators in furtherance of policy objectives. Banks
are also in a position to use contract law mechanisms to demand environmental
information about the development projects they fund, and banks often retain
considerable environmental expertise in-house or have access to it via consultants to
evaluate such information. Although banks should not be a substitute for environmental
appraisal activities currently discharged by state authorities - because of the
opportunities for public participation that commonly exist in such government
supervised appraisal systems - it would be fruitful for regulators to explore ways in
which bank-based environmental assessments could be integrated into state-based
assessments. In any event, banks could at least expect their borrowers to comply with
environmental legislation, and to provide lending on preferential terms to clients that
demonstrate a high standard of legislative compliance that poses fewer liability risks.
There could be scope within existing regulatory parameters for financial regulators to
introduce environmental standards as conditions of banking authorizations. One
potentially powerful measure would be to offer financial incentives for banks to
introduce differential interest rates (and hence cost of availability of capital) to reflect
the environmental risks of different types of development. In the home loan and
building financing markets, some lenders are offering 'green mortgages' as a way of
meeting consumer demand for environmentally friendly, energy-efficient houses. The
lending schemes vary in criteria and benefits, but in general the loans offer borrowers
higher credit ratios and, sometimes, lower interest rates.84 But as with ethical investment
funds, green mortgages represent a niche segment of the financial markets currently
addressed by only a few institutions, and the incentives for more general practices in the
banking sector in this area seem to be lacking. Again, government intervention is
required.
83. R. Lastra, Central Banking and Banking Regulation, (Financial Markets Group, 1996).
84. See, e.g., S. Brady, 'Fannie Mae/NAHB Launch Effort to Develop "Green" Mortgages', 6 Professional
Builder (1999), 1.
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Governments could encourage banks to give preferential treatment to projects that meet
sustainability criteria by providing tax relief for profits earned on environmental-
friendly development loans. The Netherlands has explored the taxation option, and in
January 1995 the Dutch government introduced a green investment scheme that allows
banks to offer depositors funds whose interest or dividends are exempt from personal
taxation. In order to qualify, the fund must invest at least 70 per cent of its assets in
environmentally friendly projects (e.g., renewable energy and organic agriculture)."
Because of this initiative, several Dutch banks moved to set up their own green
investment funds, which have been heavily subscribed. The attractive interest rates for
investors result in more funding of progressive new projects that were formerly
perceived as risky with limited return. 6 Although these unique reforms may be
explained by the fact that the Netherlands is a country with a relatively high level of
environmental awareness, and a strong tradition of environmental law innovation, other
countries may now follow suit given emerging evidence that the Dutch green
investment scheme is encouraging sustainable development projects.
Beyond controls on the operation of banks, governments can promote environmentally
responsible lending through appropriately directed liability legislation. Increased lender
liability may eventually lead to a reduction in the number of environmentally damaging
activities that are financed and thereby eliminate industries and businesses associated
with environmental problems in the market. Environmental lender liability has become
a grievance in various industrial economies because of legislative changes or judicial
precedents. The potential environmental liability of lenders arises from the definitions
of 'owner', 'operator', 'permits' or 'causes' found in pollution control legislation. A
wide interpretation of such words may implicate lenders despite the fact that they had
no direct role in causing the contamination. Liability could occur as the result of being
the potential owner of a contaminated property, through the right to realize the
borrower's security, or by providing guarantees for firms with potential or actual
environmental liability (e.g., firms handling hazardous wastes).
The most persuasive evidence of the effect of government intervention into financial
markets is in the US where the behaviour of banks has been profoundly influenced by
the implementation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) 1980, which may make a lender vicariously liable for
85. Netherlands Agency for Energy and the Environment (Novem), Financing Energy and Environmental
Technology: The Dutch Way, (Novem, 1997).
86. Jencken, Sustainable Finance and Banking, 92-95.
87. T. van Bellegem et al., Green Investment Funds: Organic Farming, (OECD, 1997).
88. Lipton, 'Project Financing and the Environment: Lender Liability for Environmental Damage in
Australia', 11 Journal ofInternational Banking Law 1 (1996), 7; M.H. Ogilvie, 'Enter at Your Own
Risk: Environmental Lender Liability in Canada', 40 Journal ofBusiness Law (1996), 94.
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contaminated site remediation.89 According to a survey by the American Bankers'
Association, 62 per cent of community commercial banks had rejected loan applications
or potential borrowers because of the possibility of environmental liability and 45 per
cent had withdrawn from lending in known hazardous sectors because of similar
concerns. 90 The US experience has been followed with interest in Europe, where the
European Commission released in early 2002 a draft environmental liability directive. 91
The Commission's proposals avoids specifically attaching liability to financial sponsors
but leaves open the possibility of lender liability where banks exercise operational
control over polluting facilities or sites.
More research is needed into the optimal liability regime - one that provides appropriate
incentives for banks to eschew funding environmentally contentious developments
without stifling potentially socially valuable investments. For instance, whilst the
retroactive nature of some environmental liability regimes may further environmental
compensation goals, there is little deterrence effect from the penalizing of organizations
for unforeseeable, non-negligent contamination caused by distant activities, except to
the extent that actors predict future changes in liability regimes that would provide for
such retroactive liability.92 This situation can be compounded by joint and several
liability. The latter is a mechanism for mutual regulation, encouraging each party to
contract only with other reputable parties and creating strong incentives for parties to
monitor one another's behaviour.93 Joint and several liability rules are at odds with the
polluter pays principle in that they encourage the channelling of liability to the deepest
pockets, namely financial lenders, rather than the actual contributor of environmental
harm.94 Although there is a need for further empirical evidence to clarify the matters, it
appears that joint and several liability can cause 'over-deterrence' by deep pocket
parties and 'under-deterrence' by less solvent parties who may believe that no claims
will be brought against them for environmental harm. 95 Joint and several liability can
89. Berz, 'Lender Liability under CERCLA: In Search of a New Deep Pocket', 108 Banking Law Journal
1 (1991), 4; J. Norton, 'Lender Liability in the United States', in R. Cranston (ed.), Banks, Liability
and Risk, (Lloyd's of London Press, 1995), 358-59.
90. Cited in P. Blackman, 'Part 11 of the Environment Act and the amendments to the Environmental
Protection Act 1990', (IBC conference on the Environment Act, 1995). Following extensive lobbying
by banks, in 1996 the US Congress amended CERCLA to reduce lenders' exposure to environmental
liabilities: see Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996 (HR
3610, Title II, Subtitle E, §§ 2501-04).
91. EC, Proposal for a Directive on Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Restoration
ofEnvironmental Damage, COM(2002) 17 final, 23 January 2002.
92. Lyons, 'Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished?', 6 Stanford
Environmental Law Journal (1986), 271 at 301.
93. Teubner, 'The Invisible Cupola: From Causal to Collective Attribution in Ecological Liability', 16
Cardozo Law Review 2 (1994), 429 at 430.
94. Tietenberg, 'Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and Several Liability', 65 Land
Economics 4 (1989), 305.
95. Gergen, 'The Failed Promise of the "Polluter Pays" Principle: An Economic Analysis of Landowner
Liability for Hazardous Waste', 69 New York University Law Review (1994), 624 at 674. For recent
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also pose problems to the functioning of insurance markets, as discussed later in this
article. 96 Allowing deep pocket parties to recover contributions from joint tortfeasors
generates additional transaction costs and is of little value if the joint tortfeasors are
insolvent. Current economic theory suggests partial lender liability for borrowers'
environmental harms is appropriate.97
§ 4. Insurance Markets
A. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE
The insurance sector is relevant to the environment both as a source of investment
funds, because of the premium income invested in the equity, property and bond
markets, and, secondly, through pollution and natural disaster risk assessment and
compensation. Insurance policies have traditionally been portrayed as benefiting society
through the indemnification for unexpected loss, the restoration of resources for
productive purposes and reduced uncertainty through the pooling of many policies.98
The insurance sector can facilitate sustainable development through its ability to price
various environmental risks and to help pay for environmental damage (particularly
where the liable party has insufficient resources). The environmental performance of
prospective policy-holders can thus be reflected through the availability of insurance
and the cost of premiums. 99 Where suspect environmental performers are excluded from
insurance or pay higher premiums, the insurance market should provide incentives for
improved corporate conduct.
Like banks that are becoming sensitive to the environmental performance of their
borrowers, insurers also are increasingly interested in the environmental aspects of their
policy-holders' activities. At an international level, UNEP issued in 1995 a Statement of
Environmental Commitment by the Insurance Industry that provides a framework for
signatories to meet at annual round table meetings to discuss mutual concerns. 00 An
escalation of claims associated with natural disasters and contaminated site clean-ups
since the 1970s in the US and EU has driven the insurance industry to scrutinize their
policy-holders according to standards often well beyond government regulatory
requirements. Yet, examples of good practice among insurers are often out-weighed by
litigation in a US context, see MacAyeal, 'The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act: The Correct Paradigm of Strict Liability and the Problem of
Individual Causation', 18 UCL.A. Journal of Environmental Law and Policy (2000/01), 217.
96. L. Bergkamp, Liability and Environment, (Kluwer Law, 2001).
97. Pitchford, 'How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgement-proof Firms and Environmental
Risk', 85 American Economic Review 5 (1995), 1171.
98. See K.S. Abraham, Environmental Liability Insurance Law, (Prentice-Hall, 1991).
99. See Kunreuther and Freeman, 'Insurability, Environmental Risks and the Law', in A. Heyes (ed.), The
Law and Economics of the Environment, (Edward Elgar, 2001).
100. Joly, 'UNEP Insurance Industry Initiative on the Environment: Developments in 1996', 2 International
Journal ofInsurance Law (1997), 171.
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behaviour to the contrary, such as abrupt exits from the environmental insurance market
altogether for fear of poor returns.
Pollution insurance products arose from the enactment or proposal by governments of
liability rules to govern the financing and remediation of contaminated land. A variety
of insurance products are available to cover pollution. The two main forms of third
party liability insurance are, firstly, Public and Products Liability, which indemnify the
insured against liability for environmental pollution when the cause is a sudden and
unexpected event, and, secondly, specialist Environmental Impairment Liability
insurance, which covers gradual environmental pollution.' 0' Public liability policies are
the mainstay of the property and casualty insurance market, and they aim to provide
insurance against a party's potential legal liability to a third party. Insuring against
pollution became a concern first in the US, which experienced during the 1970s an
explosion of environmental claims related to asbestos and other toxic materials once
habitually used in US industry.102 European insurance firms also began reviewing their
insurance products for local environmental hazards in the light of strengthening liability
standards for cleanup of contaminated land. 0 3 Lately, the insurance industry has also
become anxious about environmental problems associated with global warming. 04
Climate change may undermine the basis for evaluating risk and could significantly
increase losses from meteorological disturbances and other natural calamities. Such
scenarios have led the insurance industry to lobby negotiators of climate change treaty
rules and collaborate with public authorities on research and preventative measures.'0 o
In many instances, without governmental intervention, insurance markets may not
realize their full potential as an environmental governance tool. A well-known issue is
the 'moral hazard' dilemma, whereby the availability of insurance policies may increase
the tendency for losses to occur through irresponsible and negligent behaviour. This can
occur where insurance premiums are not calibrated to reflect differences in carefulness.
If insurance is available but not accurately priced (or without adequate terms), it can
undermine the deterrence effect of liability as, once a firm has obtained insurance, there
is less impetus to take further risk reduction measures.106 Controlling moral hazard in an
environmental context requires that insurers have the resources and information to
effectively monitor policy-holders' safety practices. Government regulation to require
101. W. Pfennigstorf (ed.), Pollution Insurance: International Survey of Coverages and Exclusions,
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).
102. Sayler and Cole, 'The Mother of All Battles: The Dispute over Insurance Coverage for Environmental
Contamination in the U.S.', I Environmental Liability 2 (1993), 29.
103. Layard, 'Insuring Pollution in the U.K', 4 Environmental Liability 1 (1996), 17.
104. Tucker, 'Climate Change and the Insurance Industry: The Cost of Increased Risk and the Impetus for
Action', 22 Ecological Economics 5 (1997), 85.
105. Nutter, 'Global Climate Change: Why U.S. Insurers Care', 42 Climatic Change 1 (1999), 45.
106. Rose-Ackerman, 'Public Law versus Private Law in Environmental Regulation: European Union
Proposals in the Light of United States Experience', 4 Review ofEuropean Community & International
Environmental Law 4 (1995), 312 at 313.
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corporate environmental disclosure and reporting is a useful measure to assist insurers
in this respect. However, if the control of moral hazard and the appropriate risk
differentiation function optimally, insurance theory predicts that effective prevention of
environmental harms is achievable without governmental intervention.
Another issue requiring government attention is applicable liability standards. In the
US, many insurers were so severely hurt by the liability explosion that they simply
withdrew from the pollution insurance market.107 As with banking finance, the presence
of retroactive, and joint and several liability rules, has caused insurance markets to
unravel. Abraham sees retroactive liability as problematic because the introduction of
unanticipated liability necessarily undermines insurers' faith in their ability to predict
legal regimes, and it makes it extremely difficult to assess risks accurately.' 08 If,
however, insurers can foresee the possibility of changes in the liability system that
would create liability for historical pollution, in theory this could be accommodated
through an additional risk premium to address the 'insurer ambiguity'.' 09 In regard to
joint and several liability rules, whilst they advance the compensation function of
environmental policy, they can undermine underwriting decisions since any claim has
the potential to attain the policy limit ceiling regardless of the fault or contribution by
the insured.' o Joint and several liability generates additional uncertainty because the
likelihood of liability 'is affected by the behavior of nonpolicy-holders whom the
insurer cannot necessarily identify in advance'.
Due to liability pressures, and uncertainties owing to changing judicial rulings on
applicable standards, all public liability policies in the US now have far-reaching
pollution exclusions leaving Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) insurance as the
only instrument available. Because of its high costs, limited scope and strict
environmental auditing requirements, the EIL market in the US and elsewhere has been
weak until recently.1 2 According to Freeman and Kunreuther, the underlying problem
is that most environmental risks cannot be effectively quantified to set premiums for
individual companies or industries."' Insurers need to be able to factor environmental
risk into credit risk assessments and to analyze such risks in pure financial terms.
107. McDonald, 'Financial Responsibility Requirements: Liability Insurance as an Environmental
Management Tool', 4 Environmental Liability 1 (1996), 2 at 5.
108. Abraham, 'Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance', 88 Columbia Law Review (1988),
942 at 957-58.
109. Kunreuther, Hogarth and Meszaros, 'Insurer Ambiguity and Market Failure', 7 Journal of Risk &
Uncertainty 1 (1993), 71.
110. Kehne, 'Encouraging Safety through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for
Hazardous Wastes', 96 Yale Law Journal 2 (1986), 403 at 419.
111. Abraham, 88 Columbia Law Review (1988), 942 at 959.
112. McIlwaine, 'EIL Coverage Gamble', 27 Insurance Advocate 2 (1993), 39. On recent improvements in
the EIL market, see Catanese, 'A New Era in Pollution Coverage', 31 Waste Age 4 (2001), 68.
113. Freeman and Kunreuther, 'The Role of Insurance and the Well Specified Standards in Dealing With
Environmental Risks', 17 Risk Management & Decision Economics 3 (1996), 517 at 530.
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Methods currently used for calculating insurance premiums face problems addressing
the situation of smaller firms that may lack a credible statistical profile of past loss
experience.' 14 To promote shared environmental responsibilities with insurers,
governments need to set well-specified legal standards to provide the predictability the
industry needs so that it can calculate risks in terms of it. Stable liability rules can also
help reduce the high transaction costs and diversion of resources into insurance
litigation rather than pollution clean-up." 5 Besides defining environmental liabilities,
governments could demand insurance as a condition of licencing, especially for
activities posing major environmental risks.
Apart from trends in the EIL market, there is also an international trend in
environmental insurance to move away from liability insurance toward first party
environmental damage insurance, since risk differentiation and monitoring are easier
under a first-party insurance option. The advantages of first-party insurance are that the
insured victim can arrange insurance protection that perfectly matches their desired
extent of insurance coverage. Because insurers can more readily obtain information
regarding victims' risk profiles and monitor their risk exposure, insurers are able to
achieve better risk differentiation and so control the problem of adverse selection."'6 On
the other hand, first-party insurance suffers from the drawback that many environmental
accidents involve damage to biodiversity and other ecosystem components for which
there may be no individual harmed party able or willing to assert losses. "7
B. REGULATING ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE
A mandatory financial responsibility requirement utilizing performance bonds or
insurance is one option to the constraints of current approaches to environmental
insurance. The primary reason why environmental liability insurance should be
compulsory is because businesses protected by limited corporate liability may be
inclined to underinsure for the environmental risks they generate. According to Shavell,
'insuring against liability that one would not otherwise fully bear, because one's assets
would be exhausted, is in a sense a private waste for a potentially judgment-proof
party'.18 Making insurance mandatory for certain hazardous industries requires that
insurers have the ability to effectively monitor policy-holders so as to avoid exposure to
114. McDonald, 4 Environmental Liability 1 (1996), 2 at 2.
115. Tanega, 'Implications of Environmental Liability on the Insurance Industry', 8 Journal of
Environmental Law I (1996), 115 at 132-33.
116. M.G. Faure and D. Grimeaud, Financial Assurance Issues of Environmental Liability, (Maastricht
University, 2000), 172.
117. Leiter, 'Environmental Insurance: Does it Defy the Rules?', 25 Harvard Environmental Law Review I
(2001), 259 at 313.
118. S. Shavell, Economic Analysis ofAccident Law, (Harvard University Press, 1987), 10.
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moral hazard." 9 There is evidence that company adherence to international
environmental standards (e.g., ISO or EMAS) can provide insurers with a convenient
proxy for measuring environmental safety. 2 0 Some insurers are acknowledging firms'
accreditation to corporate environmental management systems when underwriting and
determining coverage.121 Arguments that insurers lack the financial resources to meet
extensive environmental claims possible under mandatory regimes may also not be
convincing given the possibilities to tap into the gargantuan resources of the capital
markets through catastrophe bonds and similar financial instruments devised to cover
large environmental risks.122
In many jurisdictions, the issue of a licence to handle hazardous substances is now
conditional upon the licensee demonstrating that it has sufficient funds to pay for any
pollution mishap. Proof of financial responsibility may entail a performance bond
lodged with the regulatory agency, pollution liability insurance or a bank guarantee.
Mandatory financial responsibility provides a way of overcoming the problems
experienced in the US and UK where there has been a collision between bankruptcy law
and environmental law, as creditors to insolvent firms seek discharge of outstanding
environmental liabilities to enable their claims to be met first.123 If the firm is allowed to
discharge or abandon this liability in bankruptcy proceedings, as has happened
previously in Canada for instance, the clean up costs will be borne by government and
thus society.124
Compulsory insurance offers several advantages over other fiscal options to ensure
funds to cover environmental degradation.125 The problem of adverse selection in
insurance markets (whereby insurers are burdened disproportionately with the riskiest
businesses) can be minimized through mandatory insurance given that both high- and
low-risk firms must be insured (although with individual premiums). Companies may
also prefer the insurance option to other financial responsibility choices because it frees
up company funds for other purposes that might not be available where bonds and other
119. See Jost, 'Limited Liability and the Requirement to Purchase Insurance', 16 International Review of
Law and Economics 2 (1996), 259.
120. Furrer and Hugenschmidt, 'Financial Services and ISO 14001', 28 Greener Management International
1 (1999), 32.
121. Rafferty, 'Participants in Responsible Care Offered an Insurance Discount', 105 Chemical Engineering
2 (1998), 48.
122. Jaffee and Russell, 'Catastrophe Insurance: Capital Markets and Uninsurable Risks', 64 Journal of
Risk & Insurance 2 (1997), 205.
123. See, e.g., the UK cases: Official Receiver as Liquidator of Celtic Extraction Ltd and Bluestone
Chemicals v Environment Agency (1999) 2 BCLC 555; Environment Agency v Clark (Administrator of
Rhondda Waste Disposal Ltd, Court of Appeal, 10 February 2000.
124. Marin and Ilchenko, 'Priority of Remediation Costs and Limitation of Environmental Liabilities -
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act And Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act', 15 National Insolvency
Review 75 (1998), 17.
125. Richardson, 'Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance', 12 Duke Environmental Law and Policy
Forum 2 (2002), 293.
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indemnities are availed.126 The resulting larger pool from which payments may be made
could also in time reduce the cost of such insurance. Thirdly, enterprises considered by
insurers as too risky for cover could be compelled by financial responsibility
stipulations either to adopt appropriate safety measures or suspend operations. Should
insurance be unavailable, however, firms wishing to continue operations would be
compelled to appeal for government intervention in the form of a waiver of financial
responsibility requirements or provision of its own insurance.
Thus, introduction of mandatory insurance would alter the nature of the relationship
between insurer and insured, making insurers in some respects surrogate environmental
regulators. Under mandatory insurance, 'the insurer would become, in effect, a
watchdog over its customers rather than a service provider'.127 This governance
function, or what Monti refers to an as 'environmental police man', has made some
nervous about the compulsory insurance model, particularly where environmental
insurance markets are undeveloped.128 Certainly, with a mandatory insurance model,
insurers would check that policy-holders are properly licenced, and coverage would
likely be conditional upon the insured's compliance with permit conditions. But as
optimal care could be higher than mere regulatory compliance, insurers need means to
promote superior levels of safety, such as offering premium discounts for subscription
to relevant third-party environmental management systems that provide for systematic
auditing and reporting of clients' environmental performance. Mandatory insurance
would also dramatically enhance insurers' involvement in the assessment and
management of their policy-holders' risks. Access to comprehensive information to
assess corporate environmental performance is fundamental if insurers are to be
effective risk managers. Given such information, insurers can then reflect various risks
through premium differentiation.129 But unlike voluntary insurance situations where
future coverage can be denied, the cooperation of the insured cannot be assured under a
compulsory liability insurance model.
These are not the only reasons why compulsory environmental insurance requires
greater government supervision of the terms and conditions of insurance products. For
example, competitive pressures that encourage reduced coverage and reduced premium
fees could emasculate the regulatory effectiveness of compulsory insurance regimes in
the absence of corrective government intervention. This already occurs in the mass
126. List, 'Insuring the Spill', 149 Global Finance 9 (2000), 55 at 56.
127. P. Freeman and H. Kunreuther, Managing Environmental Risk through Insurance, (Kluwer, 1997),
102.
128. Monti, 'Environmental Risk: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach to Liability and
Insurance', 9 European Review ofPrivate Law 1 (2001), 51.
129. Kunzman, 'The Insurer as Surrogate Regulator of the Hazardous Waste Industry: Solution or
Perversion', 20 Forum (1985), 469 at 477.
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motor vehicle insurance markets.' Not only would insureds tend to seek the cheapest
insurance policies that enable them to meet financial responsibility obligations, but
insurers, competing for business, would also tend to offer the minimum coverage
allowable to reduce costly claims.' 3 ' As compulsory liability insurance is primarily for
the benefit of the injured third-party, the shift to a mandatory insurance system requires
insurance regulators to control market-produced exclusions and exceptions that could
undermine policy goals.
Compulsory environmental insurance is not presently adopted in most countries,
although other options for demonstrating financial responsibility widely exist. The EC's
draft environmental liability directive does not mandate insurance, but obliges states to
'encourage' companies to use insurance or some other form of financial security. 32 The
Commission's earlier White Paper suggested that development of a mandatory
insurance regime depended on improved 'qualitative and reliable quantitative criteria
for recognition and measurement of environmental damage'.' 3 There is already
provision for mandatory environmental insurance in the 1993 Council of Europe
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment.' 34 Nationally, the Danish Contaminated Soil Act 1999 obliges owners of
large oil tanks to purchase insurance against potential oil contamination liability costs.
Both Sweden (Environmental Code, 1999) and Finland (Environmental Damages Act,
1999) have pollution cleanup funds, financed by compulsory insurance payments for
high-risk operations, to fund the restoration of orphaned sites and compensate personal
and property damage where the liable party is unknown or insolvent. These schemes,
however, are more akin to an environmental levy than an insurance premium. That the
Scandinavian countries have undertaken such reforms ahead of other countries perhaps
reflects their relatively long tradition of using environmental taxes and other economic
instruments as a means of environmental policy. 35
Until the conditions for mandatory environmental insurance exist, governments should
give industry the flexibility to meet financial responsibility through non-insurance
options, as well as tolerate mutual insurance pools as a way of demonstrating solvency.
Advanced insurance pools already exist in specific industry sectors, notably the oil
shipping industry '3 6 and nuclear power,33 by which polluters collectively organize
130. Mangan, 'Acts of God Make People Ask the Strangest Questions', 112 Insurance Advocate 35 (2001),
12.
131. LoPucki, 'The Death of Liability', 106 Yale Law Journal(1996), 7 at 80.
132. EC, Proposal for a Directive on Environmental Liability, article 16.
133. EC, White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM(2000), 24.
134. E.T.S. 150; 32 I.L.M. 1228 (1993), article 12.
135. P. Christensen (ed.), Governing the Environment: Politics, Policy and Organization in the Nordic
Countries, (Nordic Council, 1996).
136. Hughes, 'Safety at Sea', 44 Risk Management 5 (1997), 45.
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10 MJ 3 (2003) 259
Diffusing Environmental Regulation through the Financial Services Sector
coverage through discrete 'risk retention groups' that function like mutual insurers.13 8
Mutual insurance pools are likely to be most advantageous when commercial insurers
are confronted with major new risks for which they lack sufficient experience to
evaluate the technical aspect of the risk and when the evolution of such risks is
uncertain both technologically and in terms of liability law. In such circumstances,
grouping an entire market within a pool for a period gives time for devising a suitable
product and assembling the capacity required.139
§ 5. Reforms for Improving the Broader Context of Financial Markets
Some reforms to the context in which financial institutions operate are arguably
necessary if an effective reorientation of investment and lending patterns towards
sustainable development is to be achieved. Investors and lenders would appear to need
much stronger financial incentives, clearer environmental information and means of
leverage in corporate affairs.
As a priority, governments should introduce a wider array of economic instruments,
notably pollution taxes and tradeable emission permits, so that the financial costs or
benefits of corporate environmental behaviour are made more transparent and relevant
to the calculations of private financiers.14 0 Asset prices need to reflect environmental
performance if environmental financing is to have an objective basis. Economic
instruments should also be applied directly to environmental friendly investments to
create tax advantages for such practices. The success of the Dutch tax incentives in
promoting investment in environmental businesses has already been noted. Eco-taxes
directly affect company balance sheets, and financial institutions should support polluter
pay charges since as low-energy users they would not be heavily penalized by new
charges. With tradeable permits, companies that are able to generate cost savings
through trade in pollution permits could become more attractive investment
opportunities for financial organizations. Creating new markets for environmental
goods could significantly augment ethical financing. The UK government's recent
Climate Change Levy and Emissions Trading Scheme are in this respect welcome
initiatives, but more extensive use of economic instruments as a means of
environmental policy is lacking in many countries.141 Until equity and debt prices
138. Baurkot, 'Into the Pool', 98 Best's Review: Property-Casualty Insurance Edition 12 (1998), 47.
139. Faure and Grimeaud, Financial Assurance Issues ofEnvironmental Liability, 196.
140. On economic instruments, see Tietenberg, 'Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation', 6
Oxford Review ofEconomic Policy 1 (1990), 17; Gunningham and Grabosky, Smart Regulation, 69-82;
Stewart, 'Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection', in R.L. Revesz et al. (eds.),
Environmental Law, the Economy and Sustainable Development, (Cambridge University Press, 2000),
171.
141. Richardson and Chanwai, 'Taxing and Trading in Corporate Energy Activities: Pioneering UK
Reforms to Address Climate Change', 14 International Company and Commercial Law Review I
(2003), 18.
10 MJ 3 (2003)260
Benjamin J. Richardson
reflect environmental performance, ethical investment and lending will remain
somewhat arbitrary in determining which businesses are favoured or rejected.
A second area for reform should be imposition of corporate environmental reporting
obligations so as to help generate reliable and comprehensive information regarding
corporate environmental performance for investors and insurers. Reliable information is
crucial to the proper functioning of capital markets, improving accurate pricing of
securities and so enabling the market to allocate capital efficiently.142 Without material
information, investment and insurance decisions are likely to be distorted. Disclosure of
environmental information can help inform consumers and investors about a firm's
level of resource use, emissions and other environmental impacts. Not only does such
information feed the ethical concerns of investors, but it also affects the market value of
an enterprise by disclosing liabilities and other factors that affect earnings and
profitability. Better environmental information is also crucial for insurers if they are to
assess and monitor environmental risks and price premiums accordingly.
Extending requirements for disclosure of environmental costs under securities laws and
other company-directed law can facilitate investors' and other stakeholders' scrutiny of
the environmental behaviour of firms. Traditional corporate reporting statements have
not adequately captured the financial consequences of a company's environmental
management. Corporate accounting has been associated with myopic, profit-centred
performance measurement. 143 However, disclosure is a central tenet of emerging
voluntary standards such as the CERES Principles and the ISO 14000 series. 44In
Europe, recently the EC published a Communication on Corporate Social
Responsibility, which refers to the desirability of corporate environmental reporting
standards.145 Among EU states, mandatory environmental reporting has been instituted
in various forms in France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark,146 and is planned for
in the UK.147 Only in the US are environmental reporting requirements well integrated
into mainstream company law through regulations promulgated by the federal Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).14 8 One reason why the SEC (set up in the 1930s) has
gone further in corporate disclosure requirements than other jurisdictions is because US
policy-makers have long traced the causes of the Great Depression to the failure to
establish adequate regulations to ensure investors and other stakeholders have adequate
142. Baskin and Miranti, Jr., A History of Corporate Finance, (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 322.
143. See D. Owen (ed.), Green Reporting: Accountancy and the Challenge of the Nineties, (Chapman &
Hall, 1992).
144. T. Tibor and 1. Feldman, ISO 14000: A Guide to the New Environmental Management Systems, (Irwin,
1995).
145. EC, Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business
Contribution to Sustainable Development, COM(2002) 347 final (July 2002), 14-15.
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information regarding corporate performance. Environmental reporting requirements are
most likely to succeed when regulators provide detailed guidance on reporting criteria
and ensure that reports reflect an enterprise's full range of operations, including
relationships with subsidiaries and franchisees that may otherwise be exploited by the
parent company to disguise its overall environmental impacts.
Thirdly, reforms should be made to systems of corporate governance to enable or direct
investee shareholders to be more active in corporate decision-making. Most EU ethical
funds use a screening approach, which tends to reduce their influence on corporate
environmental practice. As Miller suggests, 'the main arguments against [ethical
investment] are that: one cannot hope to change the ways of a major institution simply
by buying or selling its shares'. 49 Shareholder proposals sponsored by institutional
investors are a key means by which institutions can influence company policy.so In
some jurisdictions, significant barriers to shareholder activism persist, such as investor
portfolio diversification obligations and proxy context rules. The Enron scandal has
highlighted the potential huge damage that malfunctioning corporate governance can
inflict on pension savings. Various reforms are possible, although the subject raises
thorny economic and political concerns to overcome. In theory, financial regulators
could require investment institutions to register their share votes, so as to encourage
institutions to formulate and express a view on all issues put to a vote at shareholder
meetings. Another possibility is the appointment of minority independent directors to
corporate boards, nominated by institutional investor groups rather than enterprise
management. Beyond measures to stimulate accountability and shareholder
involvement, there is the persistent question of whether corporate liability should be
broadened, so as to discourage environmentally risky activities.' 5 ' Thus, in principle,
imposing liability on institutional shareholding investors for the environmental impacts
of their portfolio companies could promote environmentally-responsible investment
because of the lower liability risks offered by green companies.
The UK government, for instance, has proposed legislation imposing a fiduciary duty
on pension funds to watch over the companies they have invested in, following findings
of a government inquiry of a 'culture of non-intervention' among UK institutional
investors.152 But how this requirement would be reconciled with the EU's conservative
UCITS Directive is unclear, which stipulates that an investment entity may not acquire
shares carrying voting rights that would enable it to exercise significant influence over
149. A. Miller, Socially Responsible Investment: The Financial Impact ofScreened Investment in the 1990s,
(Financial Times Business Information, 1991), 7.
150. See Del Guercio and Hawkins, 'The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism', 52 Journal of
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the management of the investee company.15 3 Although a limited obligation to 'watch
over' investee companies would appear to have merit, amplifying this to full
shareholder liability would be politically contentious and would create major economic
disincentives to new investment.154 But for the banking sector, as earlier noted, it is
feasible to legislate for some level of lender liability for borrowers' environmental
harms given that banks generally have a superior capacity to monitor clients' projects.
§ 6. Conclusions
This article has argued that because of their gate-keeping role within the economy,
financial organizations could be able to act as instruments of environmental governance.
It has also highlighted differences in the roles of banks, investors and insurers in this
respect. Between banks and investors, banks providing debt finance have greatest
leverage over small, private companies, whereas the presence of institutional investors
occurs mainly in the capital financing markets for public companies. Whereas the
banking and investment sectors have roles principally in the initial establishment of
development projects, and the establishment and expansion of companies, the insurance
industry provides additional environmental oversight in the subsequent operational
phase of projects and businesses. Unlike institutional investors or banks that tend to be
more effective in supervising a company's overall performance, insurance usually
focuses on specific developments or activities. However, liberalization of financial
markets in recent years is blurring these institutional differences as single financial
entities undertake an array of investment, lending and insurance functions.
But throughout the financial services sector in various countries, there will be a need for
government intervention in some cases to maximize the environmental governance
potential of financial markets. This intervention may be of a more direct, 'command'
style where liability rules and mandatory insurance are required, for instance. In other
contexts, where an appropriate response from financial institutions seems more
dependent upon the right fiscal incentives and environmental information, then less
invasive instruments should be used. In both cases, however, the role of the state is to
conscript the financial services sector as an instrument for promoting improved
corporate environmental performance. In essence, the future of effective environmental
law resides not only in governments continuing to direct and influence corporations to
meet desired environmental standards. It also requires governments to influence those
that financially sponsor corporate activity to use their economic influence to encourage
corporations to behave in a more environmentally responsible manner. By manipulating
the rules, incentives and information that shape decision-making in financial markets,
153. UCITS Directive, article 25.
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governments will in effect make banks, investors and insurers part of the web of
environmental governance.
Whilst such reforms may seem politically naive, the exponential rise in the gravity of
our environmental predicament combined with the potential financial advantages from
favouring environmentally responsible financing, should in due course improve the
prospects for a new style of environmental law. There are, however, a number of
specific factors that would appear to be necessary or important for improving the
prospects for reform. Mature financial markets and the presence of rigorous financial
regulatory structures that address problems of information disclosure and risk
management are crucial conditions, for they provide a framework onto which
environmental concerns (e.g., pollution liabilities) can be effectively grafted. Secondly,
the presence of specialist financial institutions attempting to cater to niche markets (e.g.,
ethical investment funds) can provide a platform of experience and knowledge to feed
more mainstream changes in this sector. The most advanced reforms have tended to
occur in countries with a history of such specialist institutions. Thirdly, the performance
of traditional environmental law systems is important; countries with a long history of
environmental regulation with well-developed systems, such as the US and Netherlands,
are more likely to be aware of the pitfalls and limitations of current approaches and the
concomitant need to explore new styles of governance in order to promote
sustainability.
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